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Old and New: The General Line from Amazement to Habit 
What can we learn from a cultural history of technology? Beyond chronicling the devel- 
opment, introduction and proliferation of specific technologies, what can we learn from 
investigating, to use Carolyn Marvin's revealing phrase, the time "when old technologies 
were new"?1 Teclmology in the modern age has a direct relation to the phenomenon of 
innovation and novelty, and therefore to what makes the modern age rnodern. To imag- 
ine an old technology as something that was once new means, therefore, to try to recap- 
ture a quality it has lost. It means examining a technology or device at Ù1e point of 
introduction, before it has become part of a nearly invisible everyday life ofhabit and rou- 
tine. But it also must mean examining this move from dazzling appearance to nearly trans- 
parent utility, from the spectacular and astonishing to the convenient and unremarkable. 
This transformation needs to be interrogated for the cultural myths of modernity it as- 
sumes and creates. The move from astonishment to a habitual second nature may be less 
stable than we think, and this instability may explain our fascination with rediscovering 
technology at its point of novelty. This essay, then, is perhaps more intimately involved 
with novelty than with technology, or rather with Ù1e intersection between them. 
History deals not only with events but, primarily, and some would claim exclusively, 
with the discourses they generate and which record them. The introduction of new tech- 
nology in the modern era employs a number of rhetorical tropes and discursive practices 
that constitute our richest source for excavating what the newness of technology entailed. 
The Universal Expositions that mark the latter part of the nineteenth and the early part of 
the twentieth centuries celebrated, represented and explained the agents and effects of the 
modern world. Their visual displays and verbal proclamations, protocols and practices, 
announced key aspects of modernity: an overcoming of space and time that allowed a 
new sense of the global in a world shrunken by new technologies of transportation and 
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communication; a demonstration and, nearly, the deification of new sources of energy and 
power, especially electricity; a narrative of prog,-ess exemplified by a series of new tech- 
nical devices and goods placed on display in order to launch them into the world of newly 
created consumers; and last, but not least, a mode of highly stimulated spectatorship in 
which huge crowds were encouraged to envision a future that would be simultaneously 
spectacular and convenient. 2 We are all aware of the ambivalence of these official celebra- 
tions, the racism inherent in their myths of globalized progress and the exploitation of 
world-wide laboring populations, camouflaged by a narrative of an irresistible march of 
mankind towards an exalted future.' But there is more to be uncovered in these Exposi- 
tions than an ideological swindle, if only in their contradictions. 
Primary among these is the paradoxical celebration in these festivals of the novel in the 
guise of the eternal, and of the technological in the form of magic. Expositions primarily 
presented a conservative face, such as the Columbian Exposition of 1893 in Chicago 
whose White City imaged an Imperial Utopia considered appropriate to a nation garner- 
ing its first colonial possessions overseas, while turning its face away from the smoke 
wreathed gray city of slums a few miles from the fairgrounds."' But every visitor knew that 
this pastiche of Rome and Venice was made of plaster rather than marble, designed to dis- 
solve and disappear within a year of festivities. 5 Indeed, the ruins and conflagrations left 
in its wake drew almost as large crowds as its glorious opening. Monuments to progress 
- possess an inherent instability, as the attractions of a consumer society depend on novelty 
as much as utility, seeking cheaper and more attractive as well as more effective methods 
;nd devices. Newness and amazement became a mode of reception for technology at 
these Expositions. 
Novelty in modernity enacts a consistent scenario. Initial reactions express aston- 
ishment, which gradually gives way to an acceptance of the new technology as second 
nature, in both the colloquial meaning of that term-an accustomed familiarity- 
("it's second nature to me now"), and in the more complex meaning the term acquired 
in the ~vork of Lukacs and the Frankfort school, of a reified human-made environment 
which confronts mankind as an alien reality. Astonishment and familiarity contrast 
strongly, but they form successive stages within modern experience and are therefore 
interrelated. The appearance of a new technology is celebrated for its novelty and 
astonishment is the proclaimed response. This is precisely the experience that the 
Universal Expositions were designed lo provoke, the thrill they offered their mass 
audience. It can be summed up by the response of one visitor to the Philadelphia Cen- 
tennial Exposition in a postcard home: "Dear Mother: Oh. Oh. 00000000!"6 and by 
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Owen Wister's description of his entrance to the Columbian Exposition .. my 
mind was dazzled to a standstill."7 
But astonishment is inherently an unstable and temporary experience. One finds it 
difficult to be continually astonished by the same thing. Astonishment gives way to famil- 
iarity. Astonishment acts as a sort of threshold experience and for this reason, the actual 
approach to a World Exposition, as Wister noted, was often the most dazzling experi- 
encc, one renewed by the visitor's first entrance into the various pavilions. A journalist 
described entering the Palace of Electricity at the 1904 Louisiana Purchase Exposition by 
noting, "As you enter the Palace of Electricity you hear uncanny whirrings and snappings; 
you see electrical lights of hues and intensities that you never saw before; strange 
machines begin to glide or whirr or glow or click."8 Such visual and auditory novelty 
beckons one to enter into a new world. But once within, once past the threshold, 
astonishment gives way to curiosity and investigation and eventually to familiarity. (This 
account of the Palace of Electricity continues with the statement, "the meaning of all 
these things is that electricity is put to more varied uses ... than ever before."9) The nar- 
rative of the World Exposition opens with heightened astonishment, gradually fading 
into understanding as the dazzle of the first encounter yields to knowledge. 
Although this arc of reaction exemplifies the response to new technology in moder- 
nity, it draws on fairly universal cognitive patterns. John Onians's incisive essay, "I Won- 
de1· . . A Short History of Amazement" offers a cognitive understanding of this cycle, 
st.iting, "If we are to write a history of wonder we must write a natural history"!" In his 
outline of this process he sees four stages by which amazement leads to learning: ( 1) a 
~triking experience, usually visual, but sometimes aural; (2) a consequent physical paral- 
ysis; and (3) a mental reaction which results in something being learned which may be 
Iollowed by ( 4) a new action. 11 
Onians relates his natural history of amazement to Darwin's analysis of the expression 
of emotions in man and animals. For Darwin, the characteristic expression of amazement 
involved raising the eyebrows and opening the mouth. The practical aspects of this ex- 
pression lay in the improvement of vision and the easing of breathing (the "00000000" of 
the Centennial Exposition visitor or "wow!" of a sports fan simply vocalizes this sharp 
intake of breathe). 12 Modern modifications of this explanation, based on the chemical 
processes of the brain, still fundamentally describe amazement as an adaptive behavior 
to new stimulus.13 The physiognomy of astonishment was well known and employed 
hy painters from Leonardo through Le Brun. 14 Le Brun's mentor, Descartes, describes 
amazement clearly in The Passions 1:f the Soul: 
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When our first encounter with some object surprises us and we find it novel, or very diff- 
erent from what we formerly knew of from what we supposed it ought to be, this causes us 
to wonder and to be astonished at it. Since all this may happen before we know whether or 
not the object is beneficial to us, l regard wonder as the first of all the passions;" 
Astonishment may shed light on the cycles of cultural as well as natural history. Oni- 
ans declares the sixteenth and seventeenth century as a "great period of wonder" due to 
the mass of new discoveries, technological and territorial, during this period. 16 This pe- 
riod of astonishment "was brought to an end . . by a wave of explanation and classifica- 
tion"!" If there are periods of cultural wonder, then the period roughly from the 1870s 
through to World War I would seem a likely candidate, an era of technological accelera- 
tion and transformation of the environment. Onians sees all periods of wonder as marked 
by the display of novelties (from the collections of Assuruasirpal II of Assyria to the cab- 
inets of curiosity of Rudolph li), 18 and the World Expositions played this role in the mod- 
ern period, with a global consciousness, industrial context and mass appeal that defined 
their modern characteristic. However, Onians declares the sixteenth and seventeenth 
century as the last great period of wonder, undoubtedly because of the greater availabil- 
ity of scientific explanations after this period. But even a cursory glance at the World 
Expositions reveals that the display of curiosities and the fascination caused by them 
continues and gains power in the modern era. The cycle between amazement and expla- 
nation may have become shorter, but one could also claim that the increased pace of 
modernity supplies a constant stream of environmental changes, sufficient to renew won- 
der even if in shorter cycles. 
What happens in modernity to the initial wonder at a new technology or device when 
the novelty has faded into the banality of the everyday? One might claim that having gone 
through Onians's four phases, wonder becomes subsumed in action, then in habitual ac- 
tion and ultimately in the diametric opposite of wonder, automatism. This creates a world 
of disenchantment. Effects that seemed miraculous or wondrous, through their rational 
interpretation become banal, and even the astonishing becomes familiar. Although I feel 
this is an accurate description of one aspect of the cycles of modernity, I am not fully 
satisfied that it completely explains the modern alternation between astonishment and 
familiarity that the World Exposition first rehearsed. The contrast between Onians's 
cognitive description of mdiv ulua! astonishment in which astonishment would of neces- 
sity be short-lived, and a social and historical concept like a century of wonder should 
give us pause. As illuminating as the cognitive description of the cycle of astonishment 
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may be, I do not think it offers us an unmediated understanding of the role of astonish- 
ment in modernity or of the fascination with "new" technology. 
Wonder and curiosity seem to be universal human traits and I believe their investiga- 
tion provides insight into their historical manifestations. But we are dealing not simply 
with individual experiences but with social practices and I, for one, am unwilling to en- 
ter into a debate about which causes which. Mediation enters into the natural in unex- 
pected ways, as a brief excursus on the illustration Onians borrows from Darwin to 
portray the typical expression of astonishment reveals. It derives, of course, from G. B. 
Duchenne de Boulogne's famous photographs of typical expressions of the human face.19 
As a physiologist, Duchenne was primarily interested in the mechanics of facial expres- 
sions, which muscles were involved in their creation. He understood facial movement as 
part of a God-given language of expression. The expression reproduced by Darwin and 
Onians was not a spontaneous reaction by a human subject, but an already determined 
expression that Duchenne sculpted on the face of his experimental subject by means of 
electrodes, to be photographed by Nadar Junior in 1853. I do not dispute the validity of 
1 he interpretation of this expression, but merely indicate that even in the center of a nat- 
uralist demonstration, ideas of a pre-existent facial language and the play of the then novel 
technologies of electricity and photography intervene and mediate. 
As historical phenomena, human experiences have always already been caught in the 
net of social discourse. And I believe that the "newness" of new technology, its capacity 
to dazzle us, is always in some sense the product of discourses surrounding it. Discourse 
includes more than verbal statements, although these are obviously privileged by histori- 
ans for the relative clarity of their interpretation. In the World Expositions, the carefully 
Jrranged lay-out of space and the logic of form and color in the architecture, evoke cul- 
tural associations and determine the temporal and spatial unfolding of vistas and patterns. 
The stimulus of sound and light, the prose of guide];}ooks and explanatory signs, make up 
the discursive positioning of the new technology in the Expositions and cued visitors to 
experience astonishment. The discourse of modernity, then, is not only one of innova- 
tion , but precisely one of novelty, maximizing the dazzling experience of the new. 
Making It New and Making It Strange: The Uncanny Route of Return 
But what makes the new new? Russian formalist Victor Shklovsky discovered the function 
of' this rhetoric of newness when he set out to write a history of the introduction of elec- 
tric light to Moscow and Petersburg and its transformation of the city nightscape. 20 
-, 
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He abandoned the project after combing the newspapers of the period and finding no 
mention of the phenomenon, no recorded astonishment at this major technological 
transformation. Journalists instead recorded traditional genres of news: gossip, royal vis- 
its, politics, but not the new genre of technological innovation. Shklovsky concluded 
from this discovery that "the new arrives unnoticed ?" In effect, we must learn to be sur- 
prised, at least as recorded in print, astonishment is not simply a natural phenomenon. 
Now I (and I presume Shklovsky) would not claim no one was astonished by the electri- 
fication of Moscow (he indicates, "at that time electricity already functioned in Moscow 
and some people were even delighted about the fact"22). The journalistic silence does not 
simply reflect a blasé attitude on the part of Moscow's citizens. Rather, journalists lacked 
a discursive context, or tradition, for the expressing of such astonishment. As Shklovsky 
puts it, "newspapers are extremely slow in perceiving the new because they lack a method 
for giving it form ."2 l There apparently was not a spectacular and highly ritualized practice 
such as the nightly lighting of the electric lights at the Chicago Columbian Exposition, 
or the highly publicized inaugural turning on of electricity in downtown shopping areas 
so well recorded in U.S. urban history. 21 Undoubtedly, as a social phenomenon and par- 
ticularly as one that gets officially noted, surprise is learned, fostered and expressed by 
discursive practices whose implementation brings profit to someone: merchants, policy 
makers, civic fathers justifying municipal power plants, or any one of a number of inter- 
ested parties. Modernity must partly be understood as learning to be surprised by certain 
innovations, a discourse that valorizes and directs our attention to such changes and the 
excitement they can provoke. 
And what of the final phase of Onians's natural history of wonder, its dissolution in 
knowledge and new practices? While knowledge certainly plays a role here, it may be- 
long more directly to the opening of the cycle, closer to amazement than to habit. It was 
the educational potential of the World Expositions that organizers lauded, a firm belief 
that wonder prompted learning about technical innovation. The submerging of innova- 
tion into a realm of second nature would seem to have more to do with what Shklovsky 
elsewhere describes as habituation and automatism. 21 This phase, the opposite of amaze- 
ment, indicates less a gain in knowledge than a loss of vivid experience. As Shklovsky says, 
."habitualization devours works, clothes, furniture, one's wife, and the fear of war;'26 
Rather than knowledge, the outcome of this habitualization is to render us unconscious 
of our experience. 
As historians searching for the novelty of old technology, we confront a dilemma. Is 
decline into invisibility irreversible and irresistible? Does the wonder at technology head 
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in the express lane towards either the outmoded and discarded or the practical and un- 
noticed? Once understood, does technology ever recover something of its original 
strangeness? I maintain there are several ways that this can happen. Shklovsky describes 
an aesthetic path back towards heightened perception through the technique he called de- 
iamiliarization or "making it strange."27 For Shklovsky, art takes up the struggle against 
this loss of sensual awareness. Through techniques of formal play-such as roughened 
language or unusual perspectives-"art removes objects from the automatism. of per- 
ccption'?" But for Shklovsky defamiliarization deals with perception not knowledge. 29 I 
think it is an error to believe that we possess a full understanding of technology through 
a scientific explanation of how it works. There are layers of knowledge that emerge in our 
dealings with technology that also cause us to wonder anew. Heidegger's early discussion 
of' work in terms of the dynamic of the tool shows that we can suddenly gain a new per- 
spccti ve on technology through an interruption of habitual actions. His conception of the 
tool as "the ready to hand" gives us another way to conceive the "unconsciousness" of habit 
in terms of technology. 30 According to Bein9 and Time, it is in the nature of a tool not to 
assert itself, but rather to withdraw in favor of the project it is supposed to accomplish. 
When a tool works, we pay it no attention; it seems to disappear. However, if the tool 
breaks down, if in some way it doesn't function, it suddenly becomes conspicuous. 
l would claim, then, a more complex cycle for the cultural introduction of tedmology 
tkrn Onians's. A discourse of wonder draws our attention to new technology, not simply 
,ls a tool, but precisely as a spectacle, less as something that performs a useful task than as 
something that astounds us by performing in a way that seemed unlikely or magical be- 
fore. The discourse highlights and defines this magical nature. This wonder intrigues and 
attracts us, allowing curiosity to give way to investigation and education, usually carefully 
channeled by social discourses. However, habituation dulls our attention to technology. 
But, in different ways, both Heidegger and Shklovskv claim that wonder can be renewed. 
"ihklovsky's de-familiarization employs aesthetic and rhetorical means, refashioning dis- 
' ourse away from the automatic so that the familiar becomes strange and can be redis- 
covered in its sensual specificity and vividness. Heidegger's renewal has less of a 
cclebratorv thrust. It is the breakdown of equipment that allows us to experience it 
afresh. The interruption makes the project itself explicit. When a tool is missing "our cir- 
cumspection comes up against emptiness, and now sees for the first time what the miss- 
ing article was ready-to-hand with and what it was ready-to-hand for. The environment 
announces itself afresh."31 
There are several points that I want to stress in this more complex model. First, the 
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various stages relate to one another dialectically, so that one announces the reversal that 
the next one achieves. Secondly, neither astonishment nor habit derive simply from indi- 
vidual cognition of single objects, but are triggered by changing relations to the world, 
guided or distracted by language, practice, representation and aesthetics. Inattention can 
be transformed into wonder; wonder can be worn down into habit; habit can suddenly, 
even catastrophically, transform back into a shock of recognition. 
Wolfgang Schivelbusch's influential discussion of the railway supplies a specific ex- 
ample of this dialectical interaction. 32 Initial reception of railway travel was shaped by 
concerns about safety and anxiety about the possibility of railway accidents. Early rail- 
way journeys entailed a gnawing fear of death through accident, a fear founded in a very 
real possibility, and in the novelty of traversing space at unheard-of speeds. But this fear 
seemed to vanish by the turn of the century, as new practices (such as the introduction 
of reading during the train journey) created, as Schivelbusch put it, "a new psychic layer 
that obscures the old fears and allows them to lapse into oblivion."33 But this psychic bu- 
ffer zone involves more than the disappearance of wonder through new knowledge, for 
the possibility of disaster has been camouflaged, not eliminated. A series of cultural 
practices serve to allay anxieties rather than dispel them, like the nearly sedated voices 
making announcements in international airports, which, combined with design and 
color schemes with all-too-evident calming intentions, always make rné feel like I have 
wandered inadvertently into the psycho ward. As Schivelbusch says, "any sudden inter- 
ruption of that functioning, (which has now become second nature) immediately 
reawakens the memory of the forgotten danger and potential violence: the repressed 
material returns with a vengeance."3i Just as a breakdown in equipment makes the con- 
text of the tool suddenly visible for Heidegger, for Schivelbusch a more advanced tech- 
nological breakdown seems to tear apart acquired familiarity and assurance, creating a 
disaster within our second nature. 
I would like to introduce another term to mediate between the extremes of astonish- 
ment and automatism: the uncanny. In contrast to Shklovsky's de-familiarization and Hei- 
degger's glimpses of the total environment of the tool, this phenomenon involves less a 
new perception understanding than an overriding uncertainty. Rather than clearly com- 
ing at _the end of a cycle of habitualization, the uncanny seems to permeate the whole 
cycle, hinted at in the experience of wonder re-emerging just when rational explanation 
seemed to have triumphed. I rely here on Freud's analysis of the particularly pregnant 
German term Das Unheimlich. 35 freud, following Schelling, pointed out the essential am- 
bivalence of this word, which literally means "un-home-like:' The specific effect of the un- 
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canny comes from the flowering of a sense of unfamiliarity in the midst of the apparently 
familiar. For Freud, the uncanny signals the emergence of unconscious material from re- 
pression, and it can take many forms. We must recognize that repression in Freud's sense 
should not be equated with the dulling of our awareness sought by nineteenth-century 
railways or contemporary airlines. "An uncanny experience," Freud states "occurs either 
when infantile complexes which have been repressed are once more revived by some im- 
pression, or when more primitive beliefs which have been surmounted seem once more 
to be confirmed."36 "Primitive beliefs" refers to magical and superstitious ideas that Freud 
as a 'rationalist felt mankind had properly discarded, but which, as a psychologist, he ac- 
knowledged "remained preserved under a thin disguise."37 
"Primitive beliefs" recall the discourse of wonder that mark the introduction of 
new technology, picturing them as magical creations and elemental beings. While this 
rhetoric is nearly always couched in a ironic or at least condescending form-L-thc childish 
prologue to the true knowledge to be gained~the spectacular stage managing of 
technological fairylands, such as the World Exposition, do in fact, produce that authen- 
tic dazzlement of wonder with which we began our discussion. If the uncanny as under- 
stood by Freud also harks back to childhood beliefs of in animism and the omnipotence 
of thoughts, the fact that many of us as children first encounter teclmology through the 
lens of such manufactured folktales, may in fact produce lasting impressions, preserved 
beneath a later learned rationality. In other words, new technologies evoke not only a 
short-lived wonder based on unfamiliarity which greater and constant exposure will 
overcome, but also a possibly less dramatic but more enduring sense of the uncanny, a 
feeling that they involve magical operations which greater familiarity or habituation \ 
might cover over, but not totally destroy. It crouches there beneath a rational cover, ready 
to spring out again. 
Thus the cycle from wonder to habit need not run only one way. The reception of tech- 
nology allows re-enchantment through aesthetic de-familiarization, the traumatic sur- 
facing of allayed fears and anxieties, as well as the uncanny re-emergence of earlier stages 
of magical thinking. While this may not exhaust the variety of responses that we find to 
technology (parody and nostalgia are two other notable responses I won't treat here), it 
does, I think, provide a relevant model for a cultural history of the reception of technol~ 
ogy in the modern era. But we should realize that not all technologies are received in the 
same ways and that the experiences of wonder and especially of the uncanny are more 
likely in some technologies than others. While a series of uncanny experiences seem to 
cluster around technologies of communication like the telephone, or of representation 
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like the photograph, technologies that are arguably equally important in the environment 
of modernity, such as refrigeration or canned food, don't seem nearly as subject to these 
responses. I want next to explore those aspects of technologies of reproduction that es- 
pecially invite uncanny effects. 
Technological Doppelqanqers: Modern Memento Mori 
Certain associations evoke the technological uncanny. Challenges to basic categories of 
experience-such as the locomotive's "annihilation of space and time," or the telephone's 
blurring of the categories of presence and absence-elicit uncanny reactions. The same 
is true of recording technologies that seem to alter ontological status, techniques of rep- 
resentation which create simulacra so intense they appear as to double the originals. A 
cluster of nineteenth-century inventions-the photograph, the phonograph and the mo- 
tion picture-were alJ greeted as technological responses to the ultimate limit to hum;n 
life, mortality. The photograph became the means of preserving the memory of family 
members after their death and it was this practice that Thomas Edison had in mind when 
he likewise proposed the newly invented phonograph as: "The Familv Record-a reg- 
istry of sayings, reminiscences, etc., by members of a family in their own voices, and of 
the last words of dying persons."38 Georges Demeny, an important pioneer in the pro- 
duction of motion pictures, described his Phonoscope as a technological improvement on 
the family album's hedge against death through the addition of motion, declaring, "How 
valuable it would be to illuminate the actual and varied expressions of these portraits 
which are too often mummy-like, and to leave behind us documents of our existence 
which can be made to live again like actual apparitions.'?" All of these technologies 
claimed to preserve human traits (expression, movement, voice) after the subject had 
died. As an objective form of memory, these recording techniques represented man's tri-. 
umph over death, the ultimate astonishment and wonder of which man was capable. 
But the uncanny aspect of these technologies does not reside simply in their apparently 
miraculous overcoming of fatal oblivion; a deep ambivalence marks these means of re- 
production. Each delivers an uncanny foretaste of death, as a peculiarly modern Memento 
Mori. The proclaimed technological defense against death became death's image. The 
preservation of distinctive human traits divorced from a living individual, produced less 
an experience of immortality than a phantom, a bodiless transparent, or even invisible, 
double, who haunts our imagination rather than re-assuring us. As Charles Grive! has put 
it, "my self would live without me--horror ofhorrors!"?" 
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Still photography originally generated grave suspicion due to its seeming uncanny re- 
semblance to its subject and the apparently automatic nature of its production. The new 
technology allowed a re-animation of the ontological instability of all mimetic represen- 
tation. The most extreme expression of this uncertainty appears in spirit photography, 
the belief that this new sensitive medium could pick up the images of invisible spirits of 
the dead hovering around a posing subject. Photography possessed supernatural associa- 
tions for writers like Balzac who thought photographs captured a series of emanations 
from the surfaces ofthings,41 or Hawthorne whose daguerrotypist Holgrave in The House 
of the Seven Gables claimed photography brought out the secret character of subjects in a 
way no painter could match.:'? The ties of these frozen images to death have been widely 
remarked upon from the beginning, when photographs took on an important role in 
'memorial imagery, to the recent eloquent characterization by Roland Barthes of photog- 
raphers as the contemporary agents of the image of death .'13 
Do such associations apply to moving pictures? Barthes derives part of photography's 
connection to death from its suspended ternporalitv: it is death in the future that still pho- 
tographs convcv.:" Moving images would seem to evoke the very stuff of anirnation, of 
life, as one early commentator put it, they "catch life on the fly."·» Yet this asymptotic ap- 
proach to the reproduction of life produces the effect of the uncanny and phantasmatic. 
For Maxim Gorky, viewing Lumière's Cinematographe in 1896, the movement itself 
seemed only to stress every other aspect of reality these moving pictures lacked: sound, 
color, three dimcnsionalitv.:" For Gorky, the animated world of Lumière's new invention 
presented a gray and silent world, a realm of shadows only. Its apparent familiarity inter- 
twined with this fundamental ontological alienation to produce a sense of malaise: "Be- 
fore you a life is surging, a life deprived of words and shorn of the living spectrum of 
colors~the gray, soundless, the bleak and dismal life . .. It is terrifying to sec, but it is 
the movement of shadows, only of shadows."47 
But if the projection of shadows, of images somehow lifted from the bodies of the liv- 
ing and preserved with all its mimetic resemblance in the immaterial play of darkness and 
light, seems too easily to partake of the uncanny, what of the other aspect of the modern 
motion picture, whose lack Gorky felt so strongly, the world of sound and voice? The 
recording of sound and the recording of images share a similar ambivalence in the face of 
death. A consideration of the single most famous image of astonished reaction to tech- 
nology, Francis Barraud's painting "His Master's Voice" helps us unravel the ambivalence 
surrounding recorded sound. The image provides another illustration for Onians's natu- 
ral history of amazement, substituting a rather domesticated dog for Darwin's Halloween 
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cat. The dog, Nipper, sits posed before human technology, his clearly readable physiog- 
nomy expressing his recognition of"his master's voice" coming over this machine, his cu- 
riosity at this phenomenon, and some degree of doggie-style wonder. Animals can be as 
amazed by technology as humans are; wonder is a natural reaction to an unnatural object. 
As Michael Taussig had pointed out in his canny discussion of this image, the dog becomes 
humanized by his legible expression:rn And yet his animal nature plays a key role in the 
power of this image. Dogs' ears possess great acuity, reaching beyond the limits of human 
hearing. And dogs' intense sense of hearing and smell indicate a direct connection to na- 
ture, unlikely to be confused by the obfuscation of discourse (they can neither talk, nor 
see pictures). Therefore Fido becomes the perfect emblem of audio fidelity. Nonetheless, 
as Taussig points out, the dog is being fooled, and our recognition of this deception guar- 
antees our own human position of knowledge in relation to technology.49 Like the rubes 
who flourish in comic strips, jokes and motion pictures of the turn of the century, the 
dog's astonishment and ignorance about technology serves as a foil to our growing famil- 
iarity with this second nature. 
The global circulation of this image is striking. Not only was this trademark recognized 
world wide (note the wonderful scene with images of Nipper in Yasujiro Ozu's Japanese 
gangster film from 1933 Dragnet Girl), as Taussig shows, the image became a favored 
motif of the embroidered Mola blouses of the Cuna Indians of Panama. 50 Beneath the ap- 
parent disparity of the adoption of this Western commercial emblem for a Third World 
handicraft, ( and the delight this conjunction provides Western consumers), Taussig dis- 
covers the spell of the modern commodity, its aspiration towards a condition of magic. 51 
But if the Cuna blouse shows again the possibility of the re-enchantment of technology 
(which I feel is the source of its delight for us, the recovery of that slumbering amaze- 
ment), it is the two homunculi that stand as ministering attendants to the apparatus that 
highlight its magical nature. Like the little men within machines that populate both a 
child's vision of technology and advertising's attempt to endow commodities with magi- 
cal attractions, these minions convert the machine into a ritual act, completing its circuit 
between animate and inanimate. 
But two things should be pointed out in addition. First, the original image was made 
famous as an advertisement and trade mark, a discourse orienting consumers towards 
the phonograph, ev9king and at the same time disavowing a primal astonishment. 52 Sec- 
ondly, this image of master I slave discourse possesses an uncanny dimension. According 
to Taussig, Barraud intended his painting as a memorial image. 53 The master whose 
voice the dog recognizes was reportedly Barraud's dead brother, whose voice had out- 
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lasted his earthly existence. This presumably supplies another level to the dog's confu- 
sion, a canine uncanny. 
The ultimate uncanny of modern technologies of reproduction lies in the blurring of 
the frontier between life and death, both as an occult utopia liberation expressed in the 
spiritualist's embrace of photography and in a much more sober and chilling sense that 
such apparatuses have flattened out the line between the living and non-living with an 
endless loop of replayed discourse and information for which a human speaker would be 
only a contingent factor, like Dixie the Flatliner in William Gibson's novel Neuromancer, a 
computer-generated construct which continues functioning after the death of its human 
model and whose one repeated request is to be erased. 51 This triumph of an unending 
stream of discourse may sound like a basic definition of post-modernity and should 
prompt one to ask whether an essay like mine traces post-modernity to the effects of re- 
cent technologies, or whether I simply offer a contemporary reception of technology col- 
ored by the fashionable discourse of post-modernity. I would opt, and hope, for another 
alternative. I believe that technologies and cultural discourses interpenetrate, discourses 
shaping how we perceive and use technology, while technologies function not simply as 
convenient devices, but refashion our experience of space, time and human being filter- 
ing through our arts works, dreams and fantasies. 
Therefore it matters less which end of the process we seize than that we grab hold of 
the whole dog. But my investigation of the reception of technology at the turn of the last 
century makes me hesitate about terms like post-modernity. I find the two ends of the 
Twentieth Century hail each other like long lost twins. Both periods generate inventions 
revolving around reproduction and communication and, perhaps even more clearly, 
both mine these new technologies for theoretical and aesthetic implications. Although 
differences should never be underestimated, I believe that this period of early or pre- 
modernism has so much continuity with the present day that I can never entirely endorse 
the post of post modernity. We have been repeating this story for sometime, although pe- 
riodically everyone seems to forget it. It is the historian's task to recall it. 
The Systematic Derangement of the Senses 
If c1uestioning of the unified subject stands as one of the hallmarks of post modernity, 
doesn't anyone notice that this theme was first sounded in the period from 1871 to 
the first years of the twentieth century, from the work of Rimbaud through to the work 
of Freud? If Freud's discovery of the fissure between conscious and unconscious still 
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provides the terrain for most radical speculation about the nature of the subject, Rim- 
baud's earlier dictum,"[ am an other" still supplies, to my mind, the motive for aesthetic 
practices which challenge both containment and contentment. It is the tradition of the 
avant-garde that most coherently addresses the question of technology from the view- 
point of the uncanny and de-familiarization. But this is not simply a matter of an inert re- 
lation between aesthetic technique and technology as a theme. Avant-Garde discourse on 
technology responds to transformations of experience technology offers. To specify the 
concrete nature of this historical mutual interpenetrating, I would like to briefly show 
how, without direct involvement on his part, the reproduction of sound and motion pic- 
tures circulate around the figure of Rimbaud. 
The first and most powerful connection comes through the fascinating and ambiguous 
figure of Charles Cros, an amateur scientist and inventor, symbolist poet and major figure 
in the turn-of-the-century Parisian bohemian cultural scene. It was Cros who went with 
Paul Verlaine to pick up Rimbaud at the station on his arrival in Paris. And a few months 
later Rimbaud, in one of his notorious displays of contempt for Verlaine's friends, appar- 
ently put sulfuric acid in Cros's drink. Possibly in retaliation, it was Cros who showed 
Madame Verlaine Rimbaud's love letters to her husband." And it is Cros that Ronald 
Gelatt, author of the standard history of the phonograph, declares the first to conceive of 
a practical phonograph in April 1877, several months previous to Edison's invention, al- 
though due to lack of funds Cros did not produce a prototype. 56 
In May of 1871 Rimbaud made his declaration "Je est un autre;' "I am an other," or "I 
am someone else," a declaration against the classical conception of a unified self, in a now 
famous letter in which he set out the aspirations of an aesthetic Avant-Garde, involved in 
a dangerous and fundamental exploration of the limits of consciousness and experience. 57 
Now referred to as the "Lettre du voyant," the letter of the visionary, this missive was sent 
by Rimbaud to his friend Paul Demeny, a minor symbolist poet. It is not known if Paul 
showed this letter to his brother Georges, but as Laurent Mannoni has remarked, it was 
Georges Demeny who in some sense fulfilled Rimbaud's statement literally through his 
work in motion pictures, first with Etienne Jules Marey and then independently on a 
number of extremely important pioneer motion picture machines. 58 These include the 
Phonoscopc, one of the first attempts to interrelate sound and motion pictures and first 
intended as a tool for the instruction of the deaf in the techniques of speech. 59 
While this fraternal connection between motion pictures and Rimbaud's avant- 
garde project may indicate nothing more than the contingent crisscrosses of history, 
the connection between Cross poetry and his science seems to me c1uite significant for 
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understanding the cultural roots of the fascination of modern technology. Although 
most frequently descriptions of Cros as a "poetic" scientist simply refer to his lack of 
practicality in commercially exploiting his brilliant insights, 60 I believe his nearly sys- 
tematic engagement with the technology of reproduction derives from the symbolist's 
belief that they were creating a new art of the senses, what Rimbaud in his lettre du voy- 
ant describes as "the systematic derangement of the senses."61 Cros not only discovered 
the principles of the phonograph ahead of Edison, he also described the basic technol- 
ogy of motion pictures as early as 1867 and labored for years perfecting processes of 
color photography. 62 The systematic derangement of the senses and their systematic re- 
production, I maintain, went hand in hand. 
Cros's poetry, however, did not yet envision the actual transcription of sound as an in- 
spiration for poetic effects, as Italian Futurist poet F. T. Marinetti or Russian Futurist 
poet, soon to be filmmaker, Dziga Vertov did in the first decades of the twentieth cen- 
tury. 63 But the ability of the phonograph to transcribe sound ( an issue that fascinated Cros, 
partly because of his involvement with the education of the deaf)64 introduced a new 
model for avant-garde practice. As James Lastra has shown, earlier attempts to reproduce 
speech drew on a long tradition of automatons, machines that gave the semblance of life 
and whose form was based on the human body. 65 While investigations of the physiology 
of speech led to apparatuses whose form no longer mimed the human figure, even the 
version of Farber's Talking Machine displayed at the Barnum Museum, which used bel- 
lows and complex machinery to reproduce speech, still included a human head as a resid- 
ual emblem of the earlier ambition to recreate the voic.e as part of the artificial creation 
of a mechanical human being. 66 
Reportedly, Barnum challenged customers with a rewards of I 0,000 dollars if they 
could match the effects of Farber's device, a proclamation quickly removed when he 
heard rumors of Edison's phonograph. G? But neither Edison's phonograph nor Cros's in- 
vention resembled a human being. Cros's friend Villiers de I'Isle Adam in his 1886 satir- 
ical symbolist novel The Eve of the Future portrayed Edison inserting a phonograph into the 
breast of Hadaly an automaton figure of a woman he had fashioned, in order to corn fort 
his friend Lord Ewald in his disappointment over a faithless lover. This perfect robot 
woman would be supplied with recordings in order to offer Lord Ewald the delights of 
witty conversation. 68 But the phonograph, as Theodor Adorno understood, derived from 
a tradition of inscription rather than simulacrum. 69 Both Edison and Cros 'Were inspired 
by Chladni's experiments tracing in sand images left by sound vibrations, as well as de- 
vices such as the phonautograph which provided a linear inscription of sound patterns.?" 
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As Villiers has his fictional Edison proclaim , "the vibrations of sounds around us can be 
inscribed in tracks that can be fixed like handwriting."71 
As Thomas Levin has shown in his magisterial essay on Adorno's appreciation of the 
phonograph, an inscription of sound carried aesthetic possibilities rather different from 
the immediate resemblance offered by photography and motion pictures."? The curving 
path of the needle offered the possibility of a new language and form of writing. The 
inscription of sound on the phonograph record simultaneously possessed a direct, causal 
relation to the sound that made it, and yet translated sound, not simply into its repro- 
duction, but into a form of script, the pitted groove scored by the recording stylus. With- 
out offering film's illusion of an immediate reality, the phonograph record offered, 
Adorno claimed, borrowing a phrase from Walter Benjamin, "the last remaining univer- 
sal language since the construction of the tower."73 
It is this transcription of sound, rather than the trick of the reproduction of the voice, 
that fascinated Adorno. Influenced, as Levin demonstrates, by a long German tradition of 
the hieroglyphics and signatures of nature concealing encrypted messages of a higher 
realm within a fallen world, Adorno proposed the record as a harbinger of the apocalypse 
threatened by technology, with the potential to destroy the world of second nature 
through its own means.7+ Adorno concluded his essay on the phonograph record with 
these prophetic and cryptic words: 
What may be announcing itself here, however, is the shock at the tra~sfiguration of all truth 
of artworks that iridescently discloses itself in the catastrophic technological progress. Ul- 
timately the phonograph records are not artworks but black seals on the missives that are 
rushing towards us from all sides in the traffic with technology; missives whose formula- 
tions capture the sounds of creation, the first and last sounds, judgrnent upon life and mes- 
sage about that which may come thereafter." 
We find in Adorno perhaps the most sophisticated (and enigmatic) formulation of the 
uncanny of technology, the shock of astonishment transformed into the still sealed mes- 
sage of the future. Recorded sound carries overtones of first and last things, echoes from 
beyond. 
Such a conception shatters the kitsch image of Nipper harking to the voice of his mas- 
ter from beyond the grave, with a deeper sense of catastrophe in which we are all impli- 
cared. Technology's ambition to crack open the seals on the mysteries of nature produces 
not simply knowledge, but a fundamental transformation of the human subject and of 
representation and calls up obscure glimpses of a brave new world well beyond Barraud's 
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painting. I have a counter image to propose. As a young student, Rainer Maria Rilke con- 
structed a phonograph with his science class. His description of his initial reaction per- 
fectly conveys the astonishment that we have been probing: 
The phenomenon, on every repetition of it, remained astonishing, indeed positively stag- 
gering. We were confronting, as it were, a new and infinitely delicate point in the texture 
of reality, from which something far greater than ourselves, yet indescribably immature, 
seemed to be appealing to us as if seeking help. 76 
But Rilke finds, like Adorno, that it was not the simple reproduction of sound that most 
fascinated him, subject as it seemed to be to a growing familiarity and loss of power. In- 
stead, the inscription of sound itself, this runic language promised something beyond the 
already known: 
At the time and all through the intervening years I believed that that independent sound 
taken from us and preserved outside of us, would be unforgettable. That it turned out 
otherwise is the cause of my writing the present account. As will be seen, what impressed 
itself on my memory most deeply was not the sound from the funnel but the markings 
traced on the cylinder; these made a most definite irnpression.?" 
It was the visual qualities of the marking that most impressed Rilke, the translation from 
sound to a sort of writing. Rilke rediscovered this signature of nature during anatomy les- 
sons years later at the École des Beaux-Arts. Examining a skull he recognized something 
in the coronal suture: 
.. a certain similarity to the closely wavy line which the needle of a phonograph 
engraves on the receiving, rotating cylinder of the apparatus. What if one changed the 
needle and directed it on its return itself naturally-well: to put it plainly, along the coro- 
nal suture, for example. What would happen? A sound would necessarily result, a series 
of sounds, music .. 
Feelings-which? Incredulity, timidity, fear, awe -which of all the feelings here possible 
prevents me from suggesting a name for the primal sound which would then make its ap- 
pearance in Ü1e world . 73 
Let us re-imagine Barraud 's painting. Nipper sits attentive and amazed as an elaborate ap- 
paratus spins a memorial skull, its stylus tracing a path down the coronal suture, operated 
by the Cuna Indians' little helpers. How does Nipper respond? "Alas poorRainer, I knew 
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him, Teddy?" What sound issues from this cranium? Is this a collage by Max Ernst or a car- 
toon by Tex Avery? 
These specifically avant-garde receptions of technologies of reproduction reveal an- 
other dimension to the astonishment generated by new technology. Part of this aston- 
ishment comes not simply from unfamiliarity, an experience easily overcome, but from 
the prophetic nature of new technologies, their address to a previously unimagined 
future. Every new technology has a utopian dimension that imagines a future radically 
transformed by the implications of the device or practice. The sinking of technology 
into a reificd second nature indicates the relative failure of this transformation, its fitting 
back into the established grooves of power and exploitation. Herein lies the importance 
of the cultural archeology of technology, the grasping again of the newness of old tech- 
nologies. As Friedrich Kittler says, "What reached the page of the surprised author be- 
tween 1880 and 1920 by means of the gramophone, film and typewriter-the very first 
mechanical media-amounts to a spectral photograph of our present as future,"?" But it 
is precisely this imagined future, whether catastrophic or utopian or both, that can never 
completely disappear; it can only be to some degree forgotten. But what can be utterly 
forgotten in a world where the recording of the ephemeral has become obsessive? Even 
in the midst of familiarity, within the practices of everyday life, fissures open and the for- 
gotten future reemerges, with uncanny effect. The question is, simply, is any one watch- 
ing or listening? 
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